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Abstract: “Dynamic” views of heaven are currently popular, in which the 
blessed spend eternity progressing and developing, as opposed to “static” 
views, in which they do not. This is, in part, because dynamic views 
supposedly offer a plausible solution to the “Boredom Problem”, i.e. the claim 
that, given an infinite amount of time, existence would necessarily become so 
tedious as to be unbearable. I argue that static views actually deal with this 
problem more successfully than dynamic views do. I argue that the Boredom 
Problem itself rests on the assumption that, without activity to keep us 
interested, we slip into boredom by default. I examine the phenomenon of 
boredom itself to evaluate that assumption, and argue that it is false. It follows 
that a person in a state of “serenity”—who desires only to continue as they 
are—cannot become bored. I relate this to the Christian tradition of conceiving 
of heaven in terms of rest and inactivity, argue that it is consistent with the 
claim that the blessed in heaven are embodied, communal, and virtuous (in 
some sense), and conclude that boredom poses no more problem to this 
conception of heaven than exhaustion does to the dynamic conception. 
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The oldest stories in the world are stories about how man once had just nothing to do, and 
was as happy as he could be.—Northrop Frye1 
 
There is a currently fashionable view of life after death, sometimes referred to as the 
dynamic view. 2  For proponents of this view, life after death is characterised by 
constant progression or change. The blessed in heaven, they say, are constantly 
advancing in their relationship to God.3 They are not unsatisfied, since every advance 
brings new closeness to God or understanding of God, but they are never content to 
                                                        
1 In Denham (2002, 221). 
2 In introducing the dynamic view in his edited volume on the topic, Eric Silverman points out that 
most of his co–authors presuppose such a view. See Silverman (2017, 13–14). 
3 Throughout this paper, I use “heaven” in the vernacular sense to refer to the final, eternal 
destination of those who are saved, whether it be physical or non–physical; and I use “the blessed” to 
refer to its human occupants. 
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rest, because every advance also opens up new directions to follow. They are like 
mountaineers who, upon scaling a peak with immense satisfaction and sense of 
achievement, see a new peak rising before them and a new phase of their journey. 
This view of heaven goes back to Gregory of Nyssa and his famous doctrine of 
ἐπέκτασις or constant striving.4 And for some recent writers, such as Eric Silverman, 
this view of heaven is so self–evidently superior to the alternative “static” view—
where there is no change or progression at all for the blessed—that they are 
surprised to find the latter articulated outside the popular sphere at all.5  
Those who defend the dynamic view do so, in part, because it seems to offer an 
answer to one of the key problems facing belief in an eternal afterlife: that of 
boredom.6 Given a genuinely infinite amount of time, some argue, people would 
inevitably become bored to the point of preferring annihilation. Clearly, this 
Boredom Problem, as I shall refer to it, threatens to undermine the whole point of 
religion, traditionally conceived. Proponents of the dynamic view of heaven reply 
that because the blessed are always progressing in their journey into the divine, they 
enjoy constant novelty and therefore will never become bored. Silverman, for 
example, writes: 
 
…consider the superior explanatory power of dynamic views for demonstrating that 
an eternal existence can be fulfilling and meaningful. On such accounts paradise can be 
eternally meaningful because there is always more that can be known and experienced 
of the infinitely rich being of God. There is always more union with God to be 
experienced and there is always potential to expand our finite ideally functioning 
capacities for interacting with God. On accounts of paradise that include an ongoing 
relationship with God, since the afterlife includes at least one infinite good—God—
there is an infinite amount of knowledge, experience of God, and enjoyment of union 
with God that remains to be gained (Silverman 2017, 24). 
 
But while this vision may sound inspiring, on closer inspection it offers very little of 
substance. We are told that “paradise can be eternally meaningful because there is 
always more that can be known and experienced” of God (my italics). But why 
would the fact that there is always more of God to experience, in itself, make being 
with God meaningful? If I am painting a wall, the activity does not become more 
worthwhile if the wall is infinitely large. And what does it mean to say, as Silverman 
does here, that God has an “infinitely rich being”? Does God, like Shakespeare’s 
Cleopatra, have an “infinite variety” that custom cannot stale?7 Presumably not in 
quite the same way—but then what does it consist of? Are there an infinite number 
of activities we can enjoy with God? Can we talk to God about an infinite variety of 
                                                        
4 See e.g. Life of Moses II.239, in Malherbe and Ferguson (1978, 116). On the modern use of Gregory 
of Nyssa in formulating an answer to the Boredom Problem, see Ludlow (2007, 132–34). 
5 Silverman (2017, 16). 
6 Silverman (2017, 13) presents this as the first reason for preferring a dynamic view of heaven. 
7 Antony and Cleopatra Act II scene 2. 
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subjects? Can God adopt an infinite number of personalities when conversing with 
us? As soon as we ask questions like this, the shallowness of vague assertions of 
“infinitely rich being”, without any explanation of what that involves or entails for 
our interactions with God, becomes apparent. 
In this passage, Silverman does hint at some possible explanations. The first is to 
say that “there is always more union with God to be experienced”.8 But this is not 
very helpful either. Assuming we can give some meaning to the term “union with 
God” at all, it is very hard to see how it could be the case that there is always more 
union with God to be experienced. The closest kind of union there could be is simple 
numerical identity. If the blessed are always becoming more and more united to 
God, and if they are never actually becoming identical with God, then they must 
presumably approach union with God asymptotically—the closer they get to God, 
the slower their approach becomes. It is not clear to me why this would be eternally 
satisfying. On the contrary, it sounds more like the fate of Tantalus. 
Silverman also appeals to the “infinite amount of knowledge” of God that the 
blessed may enjoy. This is a common claim among defenders of the dynamic view of 
heaven.9 But this cognitive conception of heaven as consisting of infinite learning 
does not solve the problem either. What exactly will the blessed learn about God? We 
are never given any details or examples. Classically, God is supposed to be perfectly 
simple; how can this generate infinite facts about God for the blessed to learn? One 
might appeal to the fact that God’s unlimited nature means that there are an infinite 
number of things God can do or know. But while this may be true, it does not follow 
that an eternity spent enumerating them would be interesting, any more than an 
eternity spent listing all numbers would be interesting. 
Perhaps there are satisfying answers to these questions, and an account can be 
given of what the blessed would learn about God, why it would take them forever, 
and why that would remain interesting. 10  But no–one, to my knowledge, has 
provided such an account. Instead, proponents of the dynamic view seem to assume 
that merely asserting this view, without spelling out its details, is explanation 
enough. Despite its popularity, then, no version of the dynamic view of heaven yet 
provided offers a satisfactory answer to the Boredom Problem.  
                                                        
8 Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe offer a similar conception of heaven when they suggest that 
“through the everlasting years that the blessed spend with God, they are neverendingly coming ever 
closer to Him, who is Goodness itself, ever clinging more tenaciously to Him” (2009, 418). 
9 See e.g. Vaughan (1922, 73); Vardy (1995, 23–24); Ward (1998, 309); Jenson (1999, 354–55); Brown 
(2000, 122); Pawl and Timpe (2017, 99); Swinburne (2017, 355). The idea that learning is an essential 
element of heaven is so entrenched that Jonathan Kvanvig argues that a major problem with the 
beatific vision, as traditionally conceived, is that it would make the blessed omniscient and therefore 
there would be “nothing left to learn” (2017, 64). 
10 Perhaps one way of doing this would be to take the knowledge gained by the blessed to be 
personal, rather than propositional. Ted Poston (2017) and Jonathan Kvanvig (2017, 71–77), both 
building on the work of Eleanore Stump (2010, 39–63), have developed such a view of knowledge in 
heaven, but in response to quite different problems. Whether it could form the basis of an adequate 
response to the Boredom Problem remains to be seen.  
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I argue instead that the much–maligned static view of heaven offers a superior 
answer to the Boredom Problem. The answer can be summarised like this. 
Proponents of the Boredom Problem claim that there is no activity, or set of activities, 
which could remain interesting for an infinite duration. Proponents of dynamic 
views of heaven reply by trying to identify an activity, or set of activities, which could 
remain interesting for an infinite duration—normally by appealing in some way to 
the infinity of God. But an alternative, and in my view superior, strategy is to accept 
that no such activity, or set of activities, exists—but to reject the assumption that, in 
their absence, boredom must set in. In this paper, I do this by examining the 
Boredom Problem in more detail and showing how it rests upon an assumed 
principle, which I call Boredom By Default (BBD). I then consider the nature of 
boredom itself and its causes, concluding that the Boredom By Default principle is 
false (or, at best, only contingently true). I build upon this discussion to develop an 
alternative concept of heaven as marked by serenity instead, which could never 
become boring, even if there were no activity at all. I argue that this concept is deeply 
embedded in the Christian conception of heaven as eternal rest. 
 
1. Boredom by default 
 
Contemporary treatments of the Boredom Problem usually begin with Bernard 
Williams’ much–discussed 1973 paper on the subject. In that paper, Williams 
presented an argument which might be summarised like this: 
 
(1) A state of boredom, continued indefinitely, would eventually become 
intolerable. 
(2) There is only a finite number of kinds of activities a person can engage in. 
(3) To be meaningful, immortality must involve stability of character. 
(4) Given enough time, any set of activities will become boring to a person 
who has stability of character. 
(5) Therefore, any meaningful immortal existence would eventually become 
intolerable.   
 
But I suggest that there is another, suppressed premise, which not only Williams 
himself but most of his critics have taken for granted. This is: 
 
(SP) Given enough time, a lack of activity will become boring to a person who 
has stability of character. 
 
Once stated, the necessity of this premise for the argument to work is clear. Williams 
assumes that the blessed must engage in some activity or other, either because an 
activity–less state is impossible, or because it would be boring. This suppressed 
premise derives its plausibility from a more fundamental principle, which I will call 
Boredom By Default (BBD): 
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BBD: our default state is one of boredom.  
 
If BBD is true, then human beings have an overall tendency to become bored, rather 
as Aristotle thought that objects in motion have a tendency to come to a standstill 
unless actively kept in motion by something else. Boredom, on this view, is our 
natural resting state, to which we inevitably return—against our desires—unless 
something actively prevents us. So to avoid becoming bored, we must constantly act 
to keep life interesting. For some, such a task is impossible. Lars Svendsen, for 
example, describes boredom as “life’s own gravity”, exerting a pull that can never be 
fully resisted.11 
For those who, like Svendsen, hold BBD, the natural question to ask concerning 
heaven—or any prolonged situation—is: what will we do to avoid becoming bored? 
In the absence of a satisfactory answer to that question, they conclude that boredom 
is unavoidable. 
But if BBD is false, then the fact that there seems to be no activity that would 
prevent the blessed from becoming bored does not entail that they will become 
bored. If BBD is false, then a person who is in a non–bored state might continue in 
that non–bored state even in the absence of anything to keep her in it, just as, in 
Newtonian physics, an object in motion will remain in motion unless something 
stops it. 
We can see how BBD underlies Williams’ version of the Boredom Problem by 
analysing the structure of his argument more deeply. He argues for premise (4)—the 
claim that, given enough time, any activity will become boring—by appealing to the 
notion of “categorical desires”. These are desires which are not conditional upon 
remaining alive—rather, they are the desires in virtue of which we want to remain 
alive, in order to fulfil them.12 Williams introduces this concept in the first (and less 
discussed) part of his paper, where his target is Lucretius’ claim that we have no 
reason to fear death.  As long as we have categorical desires, Williams contends, we 
do have such a reason, because we want to live in order to see these desires fulfilled. 
But in the second part of the paper, where his target is the opposite claim that we 
should want to avoid death indefinitely, Williams tells us that a person who lacks 
categorical desires will not want to remain alive. Williams speaks, for example, of a 
man’s need “for categorical desire to keep him going, and to resist the desire for 
death” (Williams (1973, 91). 
This is an illegitimate shift. Williams has argued in the first part of the paper that 
having categorical desires is sufficient to wish to remain alive; he assumes in the 
second part that having categorical desires is necessary to wish to remain alive. But 
clearly, even if it is true that having categorical desires would cause one to want to 
                                                        
11 Svendsen (2005, 154). 
12 Williams (1973, 86). 
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remain alive, it does not follow that lacking categorical desires would cause one to 
want to die.  
In the line quoted above, Williams assumes that there is a desire for death lurking 
beneath our other desires, and once our categorical desires have been fulfilled, this 
morbid wish will take over and we will want our own destruction. This is an 
example of BBD, framed here in terms of “the desire for death”. Later in the paper, 
Williams speaks explicitly of boredom in similar terms, as when he asks what 
features of heaven “would stave off… boredom”.13 The assumption that boredom is 
something that must be “staved off”—that in the absence of some answer to the 
question what will stave it off, boredom is inevitable –rests upon BBD.14 
Williams’ discussion of categorical desires has come under heavy fire, but his 
critics all seem to agree with his acceptance of BBD, or at least to leave it unremarked 
and unchallenged. For example, Donald Bruckner argues that even in an immortal 
life, there could be unending variety of activity, because in an infinite stretch of time 
new kinds of activities could come into being. 15  But he does not question the 
assumption that activity is required to avoid boredom in the first place. J. Jeremy 
Wisnewski, similarly, argues that even if one’s categorical desires were all to be 
exhausted, one might still avoid fatal boredom because they could be reignited by 
external circumstances. One might have a desire to master every existing musical 
instrument, but even after this is achieved, new ones might always be invented.16 
Burley rejects this argument on the grounds that any desire that could be rekindled 
in such a way would be an intrinsically shallow one, the pursuit of which would 
become boring anyway, and which cannot be considered a categorical desire.17 But 
again, both Wisnewski and Burley seem to agree with each other and with Williams 
that categorical desires are the only thing standing between the blessed and 
boredom. They focus on the problem of whether the blessed will run out of 
categorical desires, but do not question the assumption that, without categorical 
desires, the blessed will necessarily become bored. 
But is this true? Should we grant Williams’ assumption of BBD? To answer that 
we need to consider what boredom itself really is. 
 
2. The nature of boredom 
 
Much has been written on boredom, from multiple disciplines. But there is a 
bewildering lack of agreement about its nature. Authors on boredom cannot even 
                                                        
13 Williams (1973, 94). 
14 The very language of “staving off” boredom is revealing, suggesting as it does that boredom is 
constantly waiting to engulf us and must be constantly fought. The “staving off” language is found 
elsewhere in the literature on this subject, reflecting a general assumption of BBD. See, for example, 
Bruckner (2012, 632, 633); Hallett (2001, 286). 
15 Bruckner (2012, 632–34). 
16 Wisnewski (2005, 33–34). 
17 Burley (2009). 
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agree on how prevalent it is. For some, especially in the tradition of continental 
philosophy, boredom is a fundamental human experience that transcends time and 
culture. Kierkegaard famously declared boredom to be “the root of all evil” (1987, 
286), while Heidegger rhetorically asked, “Do things ultimately stand in such a way 
with us that a profound boredom draws back and forth like a silent fog in the 
abysses of Dasein?” (1995, 77).18 Some commentators find boredom, or closely related 
concepts, to be a perennial literary concern in both the ancient and medieval 
worlds.19 But for others, it is a uniquely modern, western phenomenon, unheard of 
before the industrial revolution and the modern concept of leisure.20 
It is common for writers on boredom to point out both the difficulty of defining 
the term21 and the vast range of feelings and experiences that it covers.22 A number of 
authors comment that “boredom” can refer to both a trivial, transitory experience, 
such as the temporary dullness of an over–long sermon, and something much more 
profound and long–term, such as the unalleviated existential horror of a meaningless 
life. 23  Nicholas Lombardo, however, claims that the term “boredom” and its 
derivatives seem to be used univocally no matter what the context. As he puts it, “we 
talk about finding a conversation boring in the same way that we talk about finding 
our lives boring” (Lombardo 2011, 263).24 If this is correct—as I think it is—then the 
difference between trivial, temporary boredom on the one hand and profound, long–
term boredom on the other is one of degree, not of kind—rather like the difference 
between temporary and chronic pain.25 
But if “boredom” always refers to the same kind of experience, what precisely is 
it? Elizabeth Goodstein called it “experience without qualities” (2005, 1), but while 
this captures nicely both the difficulty of describing boredom and its monotonous 
nature, it cannot be literally true or we could say nothing about boredom at all. At 
the very least, boredom has the quality of being unpleasant. 
A common denominator to the various available theories of boredom is a sense of 
disconnection with the external environment. We often associate being bored with 
having nothing to do, but it is perfectly possible to be bored while there is plenty to 
do, if the only activities available are unattractive. 26  Indeed, for Orrin Klapp, 
boredom comes from having too much to do, not too little.27 Consequently, Sandi 
Mann and Andrew Robinson plausibly suggest that boredom is a matter “of having 
nothing to do that one likes”, which causes a lack of stimulation, leading to “low 
                                                        
18 On Heidegger and boredom, see Thiele (1997). 
19 Kuhn (1976); Toohey (1988, 151); Thiele (1997, 491). 
20 For a list of examples of this approach, see Musharbash (2007, 208). 
21 Kuhn (1976, 5); Musharbash (2007, 307). 
22 Lombardo (2011: 262); Brissett and Snow (1993, 238). 
23 Kuhn (1976, 5–6). 
24 See also Kuhn (1976, 6), who cites Sartre as using the term “ennui” to refer to both “the emotion 
that caused Roquentin’s nausea and… the bother of having to locate a book in the library”. 
25 For more on this, see below, pp. 9–10. 
26 Raposa (1985, 76). 
27 Klapp (1986). 
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arousal and dissatisfaction” (Mann and Robinson 2009, 243).28 This dissatisfaction 
leads the bored person to become less responsive to what stimulation there is.29 As a 
result, there is a vicious cycle: the bored person, rendered unresponsive to the world, 
engages less with it, and consequently becomes still more bored and still more 
unresponsive.30 
Some commentators link the concept of boredom to that of “meaning”: boredom is 
what is experienced in the absence of meaning.31 Lombardo argues that that does not 
mean that the bored person ascribes to some theory about the meaninglessness of 
life; a cheerful nihilist might find life interesting, and a depressed theist might find it 
boring.32 If this is correct—as it surely is—then we will not understand boredom 
through an analysis of what the “meaning” of life is.33 Rather, the “meaninglessness” 
of which the bored person complains is a quality of their experience: 
 
When people say that they find life boring, they are not saying that they have come to 
the conclusion that life as such has no meaning, no significance, and no purpose. What 
they are saying is that nothing engages them about life. Their deeper desires somehow 
fail to latch on to anything that presents itself to their consciousness (Lombardo 2011, 
264). 
 
What are these “deeper desires”? Dennis Brissett and Robert Snow offer an 
important insight here by focusing on their social and future–oriented nature. For 
them, boredom is “an experience of the absence of momentum or flow in a person’s 
life” (Brissett and Snow 1993, 238). They liken life to a dance, where the rhythm 
carries the dancers on from the present into the future. If an individual becomes out 
of synch with this rhythm, she loses the “flow” and the sense of progression into the 
future. Alternatively, the individual may be in synch with the dance, but lack any 
sense of “personal stake or direction” over where it is going.34 In such a case, she 
lacks “intention, choice, and purpose” (Brissett and Snow 1993, 240).35 
On this view, both kinds of boredom—that caused by lacking flow, and that 
caused by having no personal stake in the flow—are a matter of how the individual 
interacts with the world and, in particular, the rest of human society. To claim one is 
bored is not simply to report a certain interior feeling—it is “an emphatic complaint 
of being rendered nonsocial”.36 We may note that it is difficult to be bored when one 
feels part of a social group, even when it is mutual boredom that binds the group 
together. The most boring lecture, for example, becomes paradoxically less boring 
                                                        
28 Italics original 
29 Wangh (1975, 538). 
30 Thiele (1997, 492) cites Hamlet as an example of this boredom–idleness–boredom cycle. 
31 E.g. Raposa (1985, 76); Svendsen (2005, 29–30); Lombardo (2011, 263). 
32 Lombardo (2011, 263). 
33 For a useful survey of such analyses, see Metz (2002). 
34 Brissett and Snow (1993, 239). 
35 Brissett and Snow (1993, 240). 
36 Brissett and Snow (1993, 241). 
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when one realises that everyone else is bored by it as well, and consequently feels 
affinity with them. This antagonism between boredom and sociability has another 
side to it: a complaint of boredom may be a deliberate distancing of oneself from 
society, an act of aggression or superiority.37 For the aesthete, to declare oneself bored 
is to elevate oneself above the common horde and their mundane concerns. 38 
Brissett and Snow’s analysis also helps to explain another feature of boredom, 
highlighted by Martin Wangh: its relation to the sense of time. He points out that the 
German word for boredom, Langeweile, literally means “long while” (Wangh 1975, 
540). To be bored is, in part, to experience “a disturbance in the sense of time”.39 For 
the bored person, time drags; there is no sense of progression into the future, only an 
endless present. As Evagrius Ponticus famously put it, the sun seems to have 
stopped in the sky.40 We can understand this as a symptom of the loss of “flow” and 
with it any sense of purposeful movement through time. Time still passes, but it is 
not going anywhere. 
Drawing together these different threads, we can say that boredom has the 
following features: 
 
(1) It arises from incongruity between a person’s deeper desires—relating 
particularly to her role in society and sense of future orientation—and her 
actual situation.41 
(2) It is characterised by a sense of “meaninglessness”, a lack of stimulation, and a 
feeling of endless present rather than progression into the future. 
(3) It leads to psychological withdrawal from the social world. 
(4) It is self–perpetuating: the more bored one is, the more bored one is likely to 
become. 
 
What I have called “incongruity” in (1) needs careful explanation. It does not mean 
simply that the sufferer’s situation differs from how she would like it to be. That, in 
itself, does not generate boredom. On the contrary, it often generates interest. 
Whether it be organising a political protest or buying new furniture, the kind of 
                                                        
37 Brissett and Snow (1993, 241–42). Kuhn (1976, 12–13) expresses a similar idea when he argues 
that “ennui” is characterised by estrangement. We may also connect this anti–social aspect of boredom 
to its well–known negative effects on society – see Svendsen (2005, 16–17).  
38 Think, for example, of the veiled aggression of Gwendoline’s claim, made “in a bored manner”, 
that “Cake is rarely seen at the best houses nowadays,” when offered some, in Wilde’s The Importance 
of Being Earnest, Act II. 
39 Wangh (1975, 541), quoting Peter Hartocollis. 
40 Praktikos 12, in Bamberger (1981, 18–19). 
41 Boredom, then, is not quite the same thing as the “ennui” Kuhn examines, since he regards this 
as coming from within the individual and has nothing to do with external circumstances. See Kuhn 
(1976, 12). We can express this by saying that boredom always has an object – one is bored with 
something, even if it is as non–specific as the current situation as a whole. Also note that our 
definition makes boredom the precise opposite of “enjoyment”, as defined by Richard Swinburne as 
being in a situation where one’s desires do match the circumstances. See Swinburne (2017, 350). 
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activity undertaken to try to bring the world into closer alignment with one’s desires 
can be extremely engaging. Rather, “incongruity” means that (a) the world does not 
match one’s desires, and (b) there seems to be no way to bring it closer to matching 
one’s desires. The sufferer of boredom feels unable to do anything about her 
situation—either because of her own powerlessness or because she perceives nothing 
in the external world that provides an opportunity to act to improve things. The 
political protester, by contrast, sees a world that does not match her desires, but she 
also sees ways she can act to try to improve it, and becomes engaged as a result. For 
her, there is “congruity” between her desires and the external world, even though 
they differ. 
Together, these features help to explain why boredom can, in some cases, become 
so profound. (1) tells us that it has its roots in incongruity between deeper desire and 
reality; but sometimes we do not know what our deeper desires are. In such cases, 
when we literally do not know what we want out of life, we cannot do anything 
about it, and so we inevitably experience incongruity, and consequently boredom. As 
Lars Svendsen puts it: 
 
Boredom normally arises when we cannot do what we want to do, or have to do 
something we do not want to do. But what about when we have no idea of what we 
want to do, when we have lost the capacity to get our bearings in life? Then we can 
find ourselves in a profound boredom that is reminiscent of a lack of willpower, 
because the will cannot get a firm grip anywhere (Svendsen 2005, 19). 
 
If our analysis is correct, this “profound boredom” is not a fundamentally different 
kind of experience from everyday boredom. It is simply long–term boredom, 
exacerbated not only by the self–perpetuating nature of all boredom but by the 
sufferer’s inability to act to achieve her desires because she does not know what they 
are. Sometimes, as Svendsen argues, the bored person does not realise she is bored 
until afterwards, so ingrained has the experience become.42 
This is the kind of chronic, profound boredom that, according to Williams, would 
inevitably beset the blessed in heaven and cause them, eventually, to prefer 
annihilation. But we can now see that “profound boredom” has two root causes: first, 
incongruity, and second, ignorance. It is because the bored person’s desires lack 
congruity with reality that she becomes bored, and it is because she does not know 
what her desires are that she remains bored. 
This strongly suggests that BDD is false. If boredom has a specific cause, then in 
the absence of that cause, boredom will not arise. We do not necessarily need 
something to interest us if are to avoid becoming bored. It is, of course, a fact of life 
that we generally do become bored if there is nothing to interest us—but this is a 
contingent fact, not a necessary one. It is true only because we do, as a matter of fact, 
desire something to occupy our attention. In particular, we desire to do something 
                                                        
42 Svendsen (2005, 119–21). 
IN DEFENCE OF INACTIVITY 
13 
 
purposive that we can envisage progressing into the future. But it is not a necessary 
truth that we have such a desire. We can see this if we imagine the case of a person 
with no desires at all, not even subconscious ones. Such a person is, perhaps, 
conceptually possible, even if one has never actually existed. But it is hard to see how 
such a person could become bored at all. If boredom arises from incongruity between 
desire and circumstance, then a person with no desires can never experience that 
incongruity. Even in the absence of anything to interest her, she will not become 
bored. 
BDD, then, is not necessarily true. It may be contingently true, at least for most of 
us most of the time. Some of our desires are such that if we cannot act in certain ways 
we will experience incongruity, and boredom results. But even if this is the case, it is 
not necessarily the case. We might not have had those desires.  
 
3. Desire and serenity 
 
If BDD is not true, Williams’ argument falls apart. There is no reason to grant him his 
suppressed premise: 
 
(SP) Given enough time, a lack of activity will become boring to a person who 
has stability of character. 
 
It is perfectly possible for a person to have stability of character without becoming 
bored if that person has no desires. But this may not seem to be enough to overcome 
the Boredom Problem. If the only way to ensure that the blessed are not bored is to 
deprive them of all desire, does this not strip away their humanity? Would anyone 
want to exist in a state with no desire at all? 
These objections are strong, but there are other ways around this problem. 
Boredom, as we have seen, comes about from incongruity between desire and reality: 
we want to fulfil our desires, but if we are in a situation where this is impossible, we 
become frustrated. If, conversely, all of our desires were to become fulfilled, we 
might not become bored, but we might cease to be recognisably human. But there is a 
third possibility, because desires are not restricted to the two states of fulfilled and 
unfulfilled. 
Many of our desires are desires to achieve something. Once it is achieved, the 
desire goes away. For example, I might desire to win the lottery. Once I have won it, 
I no longer have such a desire; it has been satisfied and extinguished no matter what 
happens in the future. But other desires are not so easily satisfied. Suppose I desire 
not merely to win the lottery but to remain a millionaire. As long as I am a 
millionaire, there is a sense in which the desire is satisfied. But it remains satisfied 
only for as long as I remain a millionaire. If I lose my money, the desire is frustrated. 
Call such a desire a stability desire. Stability desires are not like those desires that 
Aristotle puzzled about, such as the desire for one’s children to be successful, which 
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cannot be satisfied while one lives.43 My desire to remain a millionaire is satisfied for 
as long as I retain my money. But it is not thereby extinguished. 
We can imagine a person who has desires, but the only desires she has are stability 
desires. Call such a state one of perfect serenity. Provided her situation does not 
change in any relevant way, a serene person cannot become bored. That 
incongruence between desire and circumstance which is essential for boredom can 
never arise. And unlike the case of the person with no desires at all, the serene 
person does seem conceivable. She certainly has desires, but they are all desires to 
remain as she is, not desires for something new, and they are therefore continuously 
satisfied by the maintenance of the current situation.44 
Clearly, this state of perfect serenity would be happy. It might, on the face of it, 
sound boring—but if so, this is because we non–serene people often feel a desire for 
change and activity. The bored millionaire is bored precisely because, 
subconsciously, she does not want to lead the life she thinks she is enjoying. But this 
does not apply to the serene person, whose subconscious desires are perfectly 
aligned with her current situation.  
If the argument so far is correct, then we can say, first, that a serene person is 
conceptually possible; and, second, that a serene person cannot be bored. If divine 
omnipotence includes the ability to bring about any conceptually possible situation, 
it seems that God could see to it that the blessed in heaven are serene, and therefore 
that they do not become bored. As a solution to the Boredom Problem, however, this 
is somewhat empty. In themselves, not all stability desires are desires we would 
think it worth having for all eternity. The man whose sole desire is to stare at the wall 
will, when provided with the wall, avoid boredom indefinitely—but it does not 
follow that he is experiencing heavenly bliss, or even that he is particularly happy, or 
that we would envy him.45 
In response to this, we can point out that it is one thing to address the Boredom 
Problem, quite another to give a description of heaven. If, by ensuring that the 
blessed have only stability desires, God can see to it that they never become bored, 
then the Boredom Problem has been overcome—irrespective of precisely which 
stability desires they have. But our account would be more satisfying if we could go 
beyond this and consider what stability desires they could be, and also what the 
blessed are supposed to do for eternity in their serenity, and how this relates to the 
religious life on earth. 
Fortunately, the Christian tradition contains resources to sketch a possible answer 
to these questions. It is not a great over–simplification to say that all Christian 
                                                        
43 Nicomachean Ethics 1100a. On this topic, see Solomon (1976). 
44 For simplicity’s sake I assume throughout here that “serenity” involves having only stability 
desires, but provided that enough of a person’s most fundamental desires are stability desires, 
perhaps she could still be immune to boredom even if she also has some non–stability desires. If this is 
so then total serenity may not be necessary for immunity to boredom, but it is surely sufficient. I am 
grateful to Tim Mawson for raising this point. 
45 I am grateful (again) to Tim Mawson for this point and example. 
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spiritual writing is intended to help people diminish their desire for created things 
and increase their desire for God alone. Evagrius Ponticus—cited throughout the 
boredom literature as one of the first writers to analyse the problem—believed that 
the purpose of the ascetic lifestyle was to extinguish “the flames of desire” 
(Bamberger 1981, 15; 29). This, he thought, would result in apatheia, or 
passionlessness. But apatheia was not, for Evagrius, the absence of all desire. It 
brought about agape, or love. Evagrius could, accordingly, write that “agape is the 
daughter of apatheia”.46 The monk who followed Evagrius’ instructions would find 
his desires for material things fading away, and his desire for God increasing. This, 
for Evagrius, was the definitive way to defeat the demon of acedie. 
Evagrius was just one author in a wider tradition of Christian spirituality that 
drew, ultimately, on Platonism as much as on the Bible. Gregory of Nyssa, for 
example, sees the spiritual journey as one of increasing desire for God. 47  For 
Augustine, God draws people to him through Christ,48 but this is a gradual process in 
which people’s love for God is kindled and nourished. As Augustine illustrates in his 
own anguished cry—“I have learnt to love you late, Beauty at once so ancient and so 
new!”49—the desire for God is something that must increase gradually throughout a 
person’s life. 
Suppose we adopt this conception of the spiritual journey as consisting of 
cultivating the desire for God, and reducing other desires. It would be reasonable to 
think that the destination of that journey is a state in which desire for God is 
maximised and other desires are wholly absent, or as absent as it is possible to be. 
Such a person would wish only to remain in the presence of God. If that person was 
actually in the presence of God, her desire to remain there would be a stability desire, 
and she would be in a state of serenity.50 On this view, the state of the blessed in 
heaven is quite different from their state on earth, but heaven is the culmination of 
the earthly journey.51 And one might add that, to the degree that a person feels both 
                                                        
46 Bamberger (1981, 81, 84). 
47 Life of Moses II.231–32, in Malherbe and Ferguson (1978, 114–15). 
48 Tractates on John’s Gospel 26.4. 
49 Confessions 10.27, in Pine–Coffin (2012, 231). 
50 It need not be the case that all the blessed have their desire for God maximised. Presumably all of 
them desire God, but some might desire God more than others. Thomas Aquinas envisages precisely 
this situation (ST q. 12 a. 6) when he argues that the blessed have varying degrees of charity, and 
therefore varying degrees of desire for God, and they all perceive God to the degree that they desire 
God. This seems to be exactly the kind of stability desire I am discussing. I am grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for TheoLogica for pointing this out. We may also say that if desire for God can 
vary in this way, then there is variety among the blessed – they are not all exactly the same as each 
other, which also seems to be a desirable conclusion. 
51 This provides an answer to the question: if, in heaven, the blessed have only the desire for God, 
will they not be fundamentally different from us here on earth? Does this not raise problems of 
personal identity and continuity? If, however, we conceive of the state of perfect desire for God as a 
culmination of a growing desire that develops throughout a person’s earthly life, and which they may 
wish to nurture, as Augustine did, the problem dissolves. I am grateful to Robin LePoidevin for 
raising this issue. 
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the desire for God and the presence of God in her earthly life, she is participating in a 
foretaste of heaven. 
 
4. Inactivity and rest 
 
We have a picture of heaven in which the blessed serenely desire to be in God’s 
presence and this desire is eternally fulfilled. But what would they actually do? 
As we have seen, much of the literature on heaven and the Boredom Problem 
revolves around trying to identify some activity which could never become boring. I 
have argued that this is a mistaken strategy. We have already seen that BBD is false, 
and that if the blessed are serene—having only stability desires—they will not 
become bored. If this is so then we do not need to assume that they will be engaging 
in any activity at all. If the desire of the blessed is for God alone, then they wish only 
to remain in God’s presence. And if they are in God’s presence, they are supremely 
happy. Their desire is satisfied as long as they remain in God’s presence, and they 
are assured, moreover, that this state of affairs will continue. 
It is important to note that this does not require that the blessed exist in some kind 
of timeless state.52 There are a number of reasons why a timeless view of heaven is 
not plausible.53 Certainly a period of time in which nothing happens would be very 
different from time as we experience it now, but it would not be true timelessness of 
the kind that God is classically supposed to experience. It might, perhaps, be 
something like the state Richard Swinburne has attributed to God before creation. 
For Swinburne, God is temporal, but since no events occurred before creation, God 
existed at that time in a state very unlike the temporality we experience. In fact, “no 
period of God’s existence would have been of any particular length, finite or infinite” 
(Swinburne 2016, 230). It is at least conceivable that something like this could apply 
to the blessed: they are temporal, but lacking change, they experience time very 
differently from us, and their time in heaven cannot be assigned any particular 
length.  
The notion that heaven is a place of contemplation of God is, of course, deeply 
embedded within the Christian tradition. It is effectively the “beatific vision” 
described by Thomas Aquinas and others: a state in which the blessed enjoy God, 
                                                        
52 Silverman (2017, 17) portrays all “static” views of heaven as incorporating the idea that heaven is 
atemporal, but this is not accurate. 
53 This topic lies outside the scope of this paper, but see Hallett (2001, 280–81), who considers the 
claim that heaven is atemporal (and therefore cannot become boring) and rejects it. In my view 
Hallett’s arguments are decisive. There is also no room here for a proper consideration of the related 
notion that heaven is of finite duration, but approached asymptotically via a series of infinitesimal 
intervals. Suffice to say, for now, that I am not convinced that this solves the problem because it does 
not tell us what it is like to experience such a heaven. It would surely have to be experienced either as if 
it were of infinite duration, or as if it were of finite duration. On the former, the problem of boredom 
remains. On the latter, the concept of an eternal afterlife is undermined entirely. (I am grateful to Mark 
Wynn for raising this suggestion.) 
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fully and perfectly.54 But the version of this view that I am sketching here, where the 
blessed may enjoy God’s presence without engaging in any activity, has especially 
striking similarities to the Orthodox spiritual tradition, with its strong tradition of 
conceiving the spiritual life as involving stillness in the face of God, as expressed in 
silent prayer. Theophan the Recluse, for example, stated that “The principal thing is 
to stand before God with the intellect in the heart, and to go on standing before him 
unceasingly day and night, until the end of life.”55 Kallistos Ware comments that this 
illustrates how, for the Orthodox spiritual tradition, 
 
“to pray is to stand before God—not necessarily to ask for things or even to speak in 
words but to enter into a personal relationship with God, a meeting “face to face,” 
which at its most profound is expressed not in speech but in silence… It should 
constitute not so much something that we do from time to time as something that we 
are all the time.”56 (Ware 1985, 395). 
 
The spiritual practices associated with the Orthodox tradition, such as the use of the 
Jesus Prayer and the breathing techniques of hesychast mysticism, are intended to 
facilitate this. For the follower of these practices, the verbal repetition of the prayer 
and the somatic rhythms produce a non–cognitive, non–discursive prayerful state in 
which she contemplates the divine without words, images, or activity.57 
Gregory of Sinai, one of the most important authors in this tradition, emphasises 
its difficulty and the need for adherents to work hard. The hesychast monk does not 
lead a life of inactivity: he must toil to focus his mind on prayer.58 But Gregory also 
makes it clear that this hard work is not eternal. Its goal is to produce a state of 
“stillness”, which is the key to the vision of God: 
 
In whatever work we engage patience gives birth to courage, courage to commitment, 
commitment to perseverance, and perseverance to an increase in the work done. Such 
additional labor quells the body’s dissolute impulses and checks the desire for sensual 
indulgence. Thus checked, desire gives rise to spiritual longing, longing  to love, love 
to aspiration, aspiration to ardor, ardor to self–galvanizing, self–galvanizing to 
assiduousness,  assiduousness to prayer, and prayer to stillness. Stillness gives birth to 
contemplation, contemplation to spiritual knowledge, and knowledge to the 
apprehension of the mysteries.59 
 
                                                        
54 ST Supp. q 92. 
55 Quoted by Ware (1985, 395). 
56 Italics original. 
57 See e.g. Gregory of Sinai, On Commandments and Doctrines etc. 2, in Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware 
(1995, 264). 
58 See e.g. Gregory of Sinai, On Commandments and Doctrines etc. 14, in Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware 
(1995, 272–73). 
59 Further Texts 5, in Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware (1995, 254). 
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This state of stillness cannot be perfect in this life, but it will be in the next life, when, 
according to Gregory, human beings will gain “immutability” in a “state of changeless 
deification”.60 
We now have the resources to reply to one of the arguments in favour of the 
dynamic view of heaven.61 This argument can be summarised like this: 
 
(1) The life of the blessed in heaven should be similar in form to life on earth. 
(2) Life on earth is characterised by activity, work, and development. 
(3) Therefore, the life of the blessed in heaven should be characterised by activity, 
work, and development. 
 
But for writers such as Theophan and Gregory, premise (1) is false. Although they 
agree that the spiritual life is characterised by hard work, they hold that this hard 
work has a purpose beyond itself. If the religious devotee finds that her spiritual 
labour yields results, and she grows in understanding and devotion to God, this is 
not because the labour itself constitutes spiritual growth or devotion. Rather, it is 
only a means to an end, and ultimately the labour will cease, having achieved its end. 
The sixth–century hermit Barsanuphias of Gaza illustrated this when he wrote: 
“When you arrive at the point of stillness, then you shall find rest with grace”.62 This 
connection between stillness and rest is significant, because it fits with the common 
conception of heaven as eternal rest. Jürgen Moltmann articulates a similar idea 
when he states that he believes “that God’s history with our lives will go on after our 
deaths, until that completion has been reached in which a soul finds rest” (2001, 66). 
And this aspiration to rest is found throughout popular piety and liturgy. We do not 
usually hope that the dead find eternal activity; we do not inscribe agat in pace on 
gravestones. Consider the prayer of John Henry Newman: 
 
Support us, O Lord, 
All the day long of this life, 
Until the shadows lengthen and the evening comes, 
The busy world is hushed 
And the fever of life is done. 
Then, Lord, in your mercy, grant us a safe lodging, 
A holy rest, and peace at the last.63 
 
Josef Staudinger, similarly, writes:  
 
                                                        
60 On Commandments and Doctrines etc. 8, in Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware (1995, 213) (my italics). 
61 Arguments of this form can be found – implicitly or explicitly – in Silverman (2017, 27) and 
Swinburne (2017, 355–56). 
62 Letter 789, quoted in Chryssavgis (2012, 267) 
63 From “Wisdom and Innocence”, Sermons on Subjects of the Day. 
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Heaven is the great haven of rest when this life is over. The river of time that ran its 
chequered course amid anguish and suffering, care and worry, has now flowed into 
the region of eternal calm. A deep peace, gentle, inexpressibly sweet, possesses the 
soul, a peace such as the world cannot give and which the soul can enjoy only by being 
absorbed by the ocean of peace which is God himself, to be folded for ever in its 
embrace… It is the great sabbatical rest of God into which the soul has entered; for “he 
that is entered into his rest, the same hath rested from his works, as God did from his” 
(Hebr. 4, 10).64 
 
Some have tried to reconcile this language with a dynamic view of heaven. For 
example, Henry Eyster Jacobs tells us that the language of rest refers only to “the toil 
and trouble of this life”, and does not mean an end to progress and change.65 But as 
we have seen, there is no need for such an assumption, because the happiness of the 
blessed can be secured without it. 
 
5. Three objections 
 
But is happiness sufficient? There are three elements to the heavenly life which, it 
might be argued, the view developed here cannot accommodate. These are its bodily 
nature, its communal aspect, and the need for virtue. 
One objection to conceptions of heaven based on the beatific vision is that they 
offer no role for the body, which seems not to be required simply to contemplate the 
divine beauty for eternity. But Christian orthodoxy has always held that the blessed 
will enjoy a bodily existence.66 Thus we find Aquinas arguing that the souls of the 
departed can enjoy the beatific vision fully before being reunited with their bodies, 
while also insisting, rather feebly, that union with the body is still necessary for 
perfect happiness because this is the natural state of the soul.67 The problem might be 
thought worse for a conception of heaven that involves no activity on the part of the 
blessed—if they do nothing, they have even less need for a body.68  
I do not think this is a very strong objection, because it could equally well apply to 
dynamic conceptions of heaven. If it is possible to contemplate God without a body, 
it is presumably just as possible to grow in knowledge and wisdom about God 
without a body too. There is nothing inconsistent about supposing that the blessed 
can persist in a state of serene inactivity with a body, even if it is true that such a state 
does not require a body, and so there is nothing here at odds with Christian 
orthodoxy. More strongly, we might say that the objection assumes that disembodied 
existence is possible at all, which is controversial. Perhaps it is not possible, in which 
                                                        
64 Staudinger (1964, 128; 130). 
65 Quoted in Silverman (2017, 18). 
66 See e.g. Morreall (1980, 33–34). 
67 ST I–II, q. 4, a. 5–6. See Trabbic (2011, 558–63). 
68 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for TheoLogica for raising this objection. 
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case the blessed will require bodies if they are to exist in any state, whether active or 
not.69 
The second objection is that heaven is supposed to be communal. Consider, for 
example, the depiction of the heavenly Jerusalem in Revelation 21–22. But an eternity 
spent doing nothing does not require the participation of others, removing any role 
for community in the heavenly life.70 
I do not think it is correct to think that a purely passive experience is unaltered by 
sharing it with others. Most people prefer to go to the cinema or the theatre in 
company, even though they may not do anything during the performance, even 
speak to their companions—at least if they have good manners. The mere fact that 
the experience is shared with others enhances it. Perhaps this could apply to heaven 
as well. If so, we might modify the stability desires of the blessed: perhaps they 
desire not merely to be in the presence of God, but to be in the presence of God 
together with others. It would, after all, be reasonable for the blessed to want other 
people to enjoy perfect happiness as well. Such a stability desire would require the 
communal aspect to remain fulfilled. 
The most serious objection to this view of heaven, though, is that we would 
normally want to say that the blessed are virtuous. Following both Augustine and 
Aquinas, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe broadly define virtues as “dispositions of 
individuals by means of which they act well” (2017, 98). If the blessed never act, then 
they cannot have such dispositions and cannot be thought virtuous. 
One might respond by pointing out that a virtuous person is still virtuous even 
when asleep. A person does not have to be exercising a virtue, or even doing 
anything at all, to be considered virtuous, because the disposition to act virtuously 
persists. But a person who is asleep retains that disposition because she might wake 
up and exercise it. We would be less inclined to call a person in an irreversible coma 
virtuous, because she has lost that disposition. Similarly, if the blessed are 
permanently resting, they will never be disposed to act virtuously. 
Nevertheless, we can think of dispositions modally. Even a person who is unable 
to act can meaningfully be said to have certain dispositions to act in the sense that 
she would act in such a way if she were able. If a virtuous person and a vicious 
person are both lying in irreversible comas, they may be equally incapable of 
practising virtue and vice—but we nevertheless would recognise that, if they were 
able to act, they would not act similarly. 
By way of illustration, consider whether God should be called virtuous. Aquinas 
comments that virtues associated with the will, such as justice, can be ascribed to 
God, but others—such as political virtues, and temperance, fortitude, and 
                                                        
69 Morreall (1980, 34) considers and rejects this response, on the grounds that Christian eschatology 
requires it to be possible for a person’s soul, as her identity–bearer, to exist without the body. 
Certainly Christian tradition supposes this but I do not think it as essential to Christian orthodoxy as 
Morreall claims. 
70 I am grateful to Andrew Roberts, as well as to an anonymous reviewer for TheoLogica, for raising 
this objection. 
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meekness—cannot.71 And surely it would be odd to suppose that God is virtuous in 
the same way as human beings. But according to the doctrine of incarnation, God the 
Son became a human being, and exhibited every virtue perfectly, even those that 
cannot normally be ascribed to God. It would seem, then, that although God cannot 
be called virtuous in the same way that human beings can, God can be said to have a 
disposition such that, were God to become a human being, God would act in a 
virtuous way. Neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit has become incarnate, and so 
neither of them has exhibited (say) the virtue of temperance—but we can be 
confident that if they were to become incarnate, they would exhibit that virtue. 
Similarly, we could say that the blessed do not act in a virtuous way—but this is 
not because they lack virtue. Rather, they have gone beyond the kind of existence in 
which virtues are exhibited at all. Were they to re–enter an earthly human 
existence—if such a thing were possible—they would exhibit the human virtues, just 
as the divine Son did.  
This, again, finds support in the hesychast tradition. Gregory of Sinai writes: 
 
The principle and source of the virtues is a good disposition of the will, that is to say, 
an aspiration for goodness and beauty. God is the source and ground of all supernal 
goodness. Thus the principle of goodness and beauty is faith… it is this for which the 
monk seeks when he  plunges into the depths of stillness and it is this for which he 
sells all his own desires through obedience to the commandments, so that he may 
acquire it even in this life.72 
 
On this view, then, what we call virtue ultimately derives from having a will 
perfectly attuned to God.  It is because the virtuous person has such a will that she has 
a disposition to act in a certain way. Because the blessed desire only God, their wills 
are perfectly attuned in such a way. So even though they do not act in a virtuous 
way, because they do not act, their wills are such that, were they to be in a situation 
where action were appropriate, they would act in a way we would call virtuous.  
 
6. The exhaustion problem 
 
For many, the conception of heaven that I have articulated here is an intrinsically 
repellent one. The notion of an eternity of inactivity is, for some, more like hell than 
heaven. But I suspect that much of the scholarly fear of inactivity—and of boredom 
itself—derives more from the personality of the scholars who have written about it 
than it does from human nature in general. Many academics—particularly the 
successful ones—are almost driven people, constitutionally incapable of putting 
                                                        
71 ST, I, q. 21, a. 1. 
72 Gregory of Sinai, On Stillness and Prayer 83 in Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware (1995, 228). 
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work aside even on holiday.73 Tellingly, Lars Svendsen states that he found himself 
writing a book on boredom specifically because he was unable to do nothing at all: 
 
After having completed a lengthy research project, I was going to relax and do… 
nothing. But that turned out to be absolutely impossible to carry out. Obviously, I was 
unable to do nothing (Svendsen 2005, 7–8). 
 
But is this typical of human beings in general? Svendsen himself goes on to express a 
kind of horrified amazement at the majority of people who work all day, spend four 
hours watching TV in the evening, and then go to sleep. Only boredom, he thinks, 
could motivate such depressingly passive leisure activity. There is something elitist, 
even classist, about such denigration of the leisure habits of ordinary people. It is 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s exhausting–sounding dictum that the purpose of relaxation 
is to restore our energy in order to work, as opposed to the notion that we work in 
order to be able to afford to relax. 74  I would say that this tells us more about 
Aristotle’s personality than it does about human nature. To return to Svendsen’s 
example, could it not be the case that so many people devote so much of their leisure 
time to passive forms of entertainment not just for convenience’ sake but because 
they enjoy them? Is it really plausible to suppose that they would all be happier if 
they spent their time studying philosophy, or learning new languages, or practising 
musical instruments—or the other worthy activities that philosophers recommend? 
To my mind, at least, the various dynamic conceptions of eternity sound 
unattractively tiring. Perhaps that says more than I might wish about my personality. 
But it is telling that so much has been written about the problem of boredom in 
heaven, and the need to ensure that the blessed will be eternally active and 
progressing, and nothing at all seems to have been written about the opposing 
problem, that of exhaustion. But we could easily construct an Exhaustion Problem to 
parallel Williams’ Boredom Problem: 
 
(1) A state of exhaustion, continued indefinitely, would eventually become 
intolerable. 
(2) There are only a finite number of kinds of activities a person can engage in. 
(3) To be meaningful, immortality must involve stability of character. 
                                                        
73 I have, for example, personally known one prominent professor to catch an overnight flight 
home at the end of an exhausting overseas round of conferences and meetings, land early in the 
morning, and then travel directly from the airport to his office, declaring himself ready for “another 
day of work”. 
74 Nicomachean Ethics 1176b28–1177a1. Just a couple of pages later (1177b4–6), Aristotle seems to 
contradict this when he states that we work in order to have leisure. But for Aristotle, “leisure” 
(σχολή) is not to be used for idle amusement, but for improving study and contemplation, as he 
explains in Politics 1333a30–b5; 1334a11–40; 1337b29–1338a30. Amusement (παιδιά), by contrast, is a 
sort of medicine of the mind, to be used sparingly to restore our energies. On Aristotle and leisure, see 
Owens (1981); on amusement, see Kraut (1989, 164–66). 
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(4) Given enough time, any set of activities will become exhausting to a person 
who has stability of character. 
(5) Therefore, any meaningful immortal existence would eventually become 
intolerable.   
 
One might seek to undermine such an argument by denying its premise (4): the 
blessed need not suffer exhaustion at all. They will, in the words of the prophet, soar 
on wings like eagles, and run and not grow weary.75 Such a reply envisages that our 
natural tendency to become tired in this life is a contingent fact about our current 
state, something that God can remove to allow us to enjoy eternal activity in the next 
life. But if it is easy to suppose that God can change people so that they do not 
become exhausted by endless activity, it is surely just as easy to suppose that God 
can change people so that they do not become bored by endless inactivity. The fact 
that the latter seems to be a stumbling block for many writers who accept the former 
without complaint is, I think, due more to personal taste than to any significant 
difference between the two cases. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the Boredom Argument is a more serious problem for traditional 
belief in heaven than is commonly realised. The dynamic view of heaven, fashionable 
today as an answer to this problem, does not succeed, at least not as it has been 
presented to date. A better strategy for the believer in heaven is to question the 
Boredom Argument’s assumption that human beings tend to become bored by 
default. A static view of heaven, in which the blessed enjoy the serenity of only 
having stability desires, can explain how they remain happy and never become 
bored, even in a state of eternal inactivity.76 
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